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Civil Rights-Civil Procedure: State Appellate Court
Judgment on Employment Discrimination is Res

Judicata in Subsequent Federal Action Under
Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
After she was discharged by the National Broadcasting Company
(NBC), appellant filed a complaint with the New York State Division
of Human Rights alleging that she had been denied" 'equal terms,
conditions and privileges of employment'" because of her race in
violation of state law. 1 After conducting an investigation that consisted of two "informal conferences ' 2 attended by appellant, Division
officials, and NBC attorneys,3 the Division dismissed the complaint
for lack of probable cause.' The Division's finding was affirmed, first
1. Mitchell v. National Broadcasting Co., 553 F.2d 265, 267 n.2 (2d Cir.
1977)(quoting appellant's brief). Appellant brought her action under the New York
Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exac. LAW art. 15, § 296(1)(a) (McKinney 1972), as
amended, N.Y. Exac. LAW art. 15, § 296(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1977), which makes
it
an unlawful discriminatory practice . . . [flor an employer or licensing

agency, because of the age, race, creed, color, national origin, sex, or disability, or marital status of any individual, to refuse to hire or employ or to
bar or to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate
against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges
of employment.
The New York Human Rights Law was one of the earliest modem attempts by a
state to legislate against discrimination, and it has served as a model for similar
legislation in many other states. See generallyM. SovERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL
DISCRIMNAT1ON IN EMPLOYMENT 19-31 (1966).
2. 553 F.2d at 267. Such informal investigations are not uncommon under the
New York law. See, e.g., State Div. of Human Rights v. Buffalo Auto Glass Co., 42
App. Div. 2d 678, 344 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1973) (mei.).
3. Appellant was not represented by an attorney when she commenced this action and continued to be unrepresented until after affirmance of the Division's action
by the New York Human Rights Appeal Board. See 553 F.2d at 267-68.
4. The Division was acting under N.Y. Exac. LAw art. 15, § 297(2) (McKinney
1972), as amended, N.Y. ExEC. LAW art. 15, § 297(2) (McKinney Supp. 1977), which
states,
After the filing of any complaint, the division shall ... make prompt investigation in connection therewith. Within fifteen days after a complaint is
filed, the division shall determine whether it has jurisdiction and, if so,
whether there is probable cause to believe that the person named in the
complaint . . . has engaged or is engaging in an unlawful discriminatory

practice.
A finding of no probable cause means "virtually that as a matter of law, the
complaint lacks merit." Mayo v. Hopeman Lumber & Mfg. Co., 33 App. Div. 2d 310,
313, 307 N.Y.S.2d 691, 695, appeal dismissed, 26 N.Y.2d 962, 259 N.E.2d 477, 311
N.Y.S.2d 5 (1970). In making this determination, the Division is required to give "full
credence ... to the complainant's version of the events." State Div. of Human Rights
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by the New York State Human Rights Appeal Board 5 and then by the
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court.'
While her administrative appeal was pending, appellant filed a
complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), alleging violations by NBC of title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.1 A year after the title VIH complaint was filed, the EEOC
v. Buffalo Auto Glass Co., 42 App. Div. 2d 678, 678, 344 N.Y.S.2d 374, 375 (1975)
(mem.).
5. See N.Y. EXEC. LAw art. 15, § 297-a(6)(c) (McKinney 1972) (empowering the
Appeal Board "[t]o hear appeals by any party to any proceeding before the division
from all orders of the commissioner issued pursuant to this article, provided such
appeals are commenced by filing with the board of a notice of appeal within fifteen
days after service of such order"). The scope of review of the Appeal Board is generally
limited:
[T]he board shall limit its review to whether the order of the division is:
a. in conformity with the constitution and the laws of the state and the
United States;
b. within the division's statutory jurisdiction or authority;
c. made in accordance with procedures required by law or established
by appropriate rules or regulations of the division;
d. supported by substantial evidence on the whole record; or
e. not arbitrary, capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or
clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
Id. § 297-a(7). Review of dismissals for lack of probable cause, however, may be even
more limited. For example, the Appeal Board is to review dismissals for lack of probable cause only to determine whether the action of the Division was "arbitrary and
capricious or characterized by an abuse of discretion or a clearly unwarranted exercise
of discretion." Mayo v. Hopeman Lumber & Mfg. Co., 33 App. Div. 2d 310, 313, 307
N.Y.S.2d 691, 694, appeal dismissed, 26 N.Y.2d 962, 259 N.E.2d 477, 311 N.Y.S.2d 5
(1970). Moreover, the Appeal Board "may not reverse a decision of the [Division] 'in
the interests of justice' . . . nor may it substitute its judgment for that of the Division." State Div. of Human Rights v. Mecca Kendall Corp., 53 App. Div. 2d 201, 20203, 385 N.Y.S.2d 665, 666-67 (1976).
Even if the Appeal Board determines that there is a genuine factual dispute over
a key issue, it may not reverse the Division's dismissal for lack of probable cause since
to do so would constitute substitution of the judgment of the Board for that of the
Division. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. State Div. of Human
Rights, 48 App. Div. 2d 391, 370 N.Y.S.2d 96 (1975) (per curiam). Finally, "[t]he
board is not empowered to find new facts." State Div. of Human Rights v. Columbia
Univ., 39 N.Y.2d 612, 616, 350 N.E.2d 396, 398, 385 N.Y.S.2d 19, 21 (1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1096 (1977).
6. See Mitchell v. State Div. of Human Rights, 46 App. Div. 2d 844, 362
N.Y.S.2d 391 (1974)(mem.). Appeal to the appellate division is available as a matter
of right. See N.Y. EXEC. LAw art. 15, § 298 (McKinney 1972)("Any complainant,
respondent or other person aggrieved by any order of the board may obtain judicial
review thereof . . . ."). Such appeals are given "lawful precedence over other matters," and provisions are made to reduce the expense of appeal. Id.
Limitations on the scope of review in the appellate division are comparable to
those placed on the Appeal Board. See Mize v. State Div. of Human Rights, 33 N.Y.2d
53, 57, 304 N.E.2d 231, 233, 349 N.Y.S.2d 364, 367-68 (1973); State Div. of Human
Rights v. Mecca Kendall Corp., 53 App. Div. 2d 201, 204, 385 N.Y.S.2d 665, 667 (1976).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). Like the New York law,
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issued an independent finding of "no probable cause." 8
Nine months later,' appellant commenced an action in federal
district court under section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.11 The
district court granted NBC's motion to dismiss the section 1981 claim
on the ground that appellant's pursuit of state administrative and
judicial remedies had res judicata effect on the federal claim." The
title VII was enacted to eliminate invidious discrimination in employment, a goal that
the United States Supreme Court has characterized as being of the highest priority.
See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976)(citing Newman v. Piggie
Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)). The detailed and complex procedures of
title VII are structured around a three-tiered system of local, federal administrative,
and federal judicial remedies. Generally a complainant must first file with available
state agencies and allow them time to act before filing with the EEOC:
In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in a State,
or political subdivision of a State, which has a State or local law prohibiting
the unlawful employment practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a
State or local authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof,
no charge may be filed under subsection (a) by the person aggrieved before
the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under
the State or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (Supp. V 1975).
If complainant files with the EEOC before filing with the available state agency,
or before expiration of the sixty-day deferral period, the EEOC must defer to the state
until the exhaustion requirements are satisfied. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Mid-Continent
Spring Co., 466 F.2d 24, 25-26 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 928 (1973);
Jefferson v. Peerless Pumps Hydrodynamic, Div. of FMC Corp., 456 F.2d 1359 (9th
Cir. 1972); Oubichon v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1033, 1036-37 (C.D.
Cal. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 482 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1973).
8. 553 F.2d at 268. The EEOC must notify complainant promptly if its investigation reveals that there is no reasonable cause to believe complainant's charges are true
and must issue to complainant a notice of his right to bring a civil action. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(b), (f)(1) (Supp. V 1975). The finding of no reasonable cause by the EEOC
will not affect complainant's right to bring a title VII action in federal court, see
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798-99 (1973), but the statutory
notice has been held to be a jurisdictional prerequisite, see Stone v. E.D.S. Fed. Corp.,
351 F. Supp. 340, 341 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
9. After receiving notice of no reasonable cause, see note 8 supra, complainant
had ninety days to file suit in federal district court. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)
(Supp. V 1975). Thus, by the time appellant commenced her federal action, the limitation period for the title VII action had run.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970), which states in its entirety,
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to
sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by
white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties,
taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
11. See Mitchell v. National Broadcasting Co., 418 F. Supp. 462, 464 (S.D.N.Y.
1976), affl'd, 553 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1977).
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Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that one who has
pursued state employment discrimination remedies from administrative to final judicial determination is precluded from asserting in
federal court a section 1981 claim based on the same acts. Mitchell
v. National Broadcasting Co., 553 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1977).
In the decade since the United States Supreme Court first suggested that section 1981 could be used to remedy private acts of racial
discrimination,' 2 the courts have developed a procedural framework
for this cause of action' 3 and have recognized it as a remedy for
employment discrimination independent from but complementary to
title VII.' Nevertheless, the precise issue in Mitchell-the effect of
12. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 422-26 (1968). For nearly a
century after its passage, the courts had held that section 1981 was derived from the
fourteenth amendment and thus, like 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), could not be invoked
to remedy discriminatory acts in which there was no element of state action. See, e.g.,
In re Parrott, 1 F. 481, 508-09 (C.C.D. Cal. 1880); Martinez v. Fox Valley Bus Lines,
Inc., 17 F. Supp. 576, 577 (N.D. I1. 1936); cf. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948)
(construing section 1982, a sister provision of section 1981, as derived from the fourteenth amendment). In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), the Supreme Court rejected this interpretation and declared that both sections 1981 and 1982
were derived from the thirteenth amendment and were designed to eliminate "badges
and incidents of slavery." Id. at 441.
The circuit courts quickly extended the Supreme Court's dictum in Jones to
discriminatory acts in private employment contracts. See, e.g., Long v. Ford Motor
Co., 496 F.2d 500 (6th Cir. 1974); Macklin v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 478 F.2d 979
(D.C. Cir. 1973); Brady v. Bristol-Meyers, Inc., 459 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1972); Brown v.
Gaston County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir.) (by implication), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972); Caldwell v. International Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044 (5th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 916 (1972); Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co.,
438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co.,
427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970). Finally, in Johnson v.
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975), the Supreme Court held expressly
that section 1981 could be used to remedy private acts of discrimination in employment. See id. at 459-60.
On the history of section 1981, see Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America), 408 F. Supp.
916, 918-31 (S.D. Tex. 1976); C. FAIMAN, 6 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNrrEO STATES 1207-58 (1971); Note, Racial Discriminationin Employment Under the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, 36 U. Cm. L. REv. 615 (1969).
13. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976)(statute of limitations);
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975)(filing with EEOC does
not toll running of statute of limitations against section 1981 action); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974)(measure of
damages), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976); Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500 (6th
Cir. 1974)(complainant not required to exhaust administrative requirements under
title VII; burden of proof); Cooper v. Allen, 493 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1974)(award of
attorneys' fees); Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970) (injunctive relief available), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971).
14. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 468 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36, 47-49 (1974). There was some initial speculation about whether title VII
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prior state administrative and appellate judicial proceedings on a
section 1981 employment discrimination action in federal court-is
one of first impression.
The effect of prior proceedings on an action is ordinarily determined by reference to the common law doctrine of res judicata. The
general principle of res judicata is that "when a court of competent
jurisdiction has entered a final judgment on the merits of a cause of
action, the parties to the suit . . . are thereafter bound '. . as to
every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the
claim or demand.' ",i For res judicata to apply, four elements must
be established: identity of parties," identity of claims,1 7 a full and
fair adjudication," and a final judgment." This common law doctrine
repealed section 1981 by implication, but the courts have resolved this question against
such repeal. See, e.g., Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d
476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970).
15. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948)(quoting Cromwell v.
County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1876)). Res judicata is used herein in a broad sense
denoting the general doctrine by which parties are precluded from relitigating claims
and issues. See McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial
Enforcement of ConstitutionalClaims (pt. 2), 60 VA. L. REv. 250, 251-52 &n.5 (1974).
In this traditional sense, the term includes "claim preclusion" (also referred to as
"merger and bar"), see RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS §§ 45-48 (1942), and "issue preclusion" (also referred to as collateral estoppel), see id. § 68.
16. Without identity of parties, claim preclusion will not apply. See
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 93 (1942). A different result may obtain in issue preclusion. Compare Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard
Doctrine,9 STAN.L. REv. 281 (1957), with Moore & Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of Judgments, 35 TuL. L. Rav. 301 (1961).
17. Debate regarding the element of identity of claims centers on the scope of a
claim or cause of action. Compare McCaskill, Actions and Causes of Action, 34 YALE
L.J. 614, 638 (1925)(smaller cause of action, limited to "single right ... and a single
delict to that right"), with C. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF CODE PLEADING 137 (2d
ed. 1947)(larger cause of action, the extent of which is controlled by "trial convenience"), quoted in Cleary, Res JudicataReexamined, 57 YALE L.J. 339, 340 (1948). See
generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 61-61.2 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).
18. See Mitchell v. National Broadcasting Co., 553 F.2d 265, 270 (2d Cir. 1977).
Despite the nominal requirement of a "full and fair adjudication on the merits," res
judicata may in fact apply when the prior adjudication was neither full nor on the
merits in the sense that a trial preceded dismissal. Compare RESTATEMENT OF
JUDGMENTS § 49 (1942), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF JUDGMENTs § 48 (Tent. Draft
No. 1, 1973). See generally FED. R. CIv. P. 41(b)(dismissal except for jurisdiction,
venue, or joinder is adjudication on merits unless court specifies otherwise in its order
for dismissal); 1B MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcncE 0.40911] (2d ed. 1974); Note, Federal
Procedure-Rule 41(b)-A Dismissal with PrejudiceIs Res Judicata of the Cause of
Action and Operates As an Adjudication of the Merits Regardless of Whether the
Merits Have Been Reached, 49 TEx. L. REv. 372 (1971).
19. See Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 297 F.2d 80, 89 (2d Cir.
1961) (" 'Finality' . . . may mean little more than that the litigation of a particular

issue has reached such a stage that a court sees no really good reason for permitting it
to be litigated again."), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 986 (1962); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
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is supplemented in the federal courts by 28 U.S.C. § 1738, which
requires federal courts to accord the same full faith and credit to state
court decisions as would the courts of the state.20 The Mitchell court
relied on both common law res judicata and the federal statute to bar
appellant's claim."1
In its res judicata analysis, the court examined closely each element of the res judicata defense2 except identity of parties, which
was not in issue. The court began by establishing identity of claim,
finding that the state law issue before the State Human Rights Division and the federal issue raised in the section 1981 suit were identical: whether appellant's discharge was the result of racial discrimination.Y
The court next determined that the proceedings in the Human
Rights Division were a full and fair adjudication on the merits, noting
that less than a full evidentiary hearing could satisfy this element.2
This determination was buttressed by the similarity between the
standard used by the Division for judging the sufficiency of a complaint and that used by federal courts when considering motions to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure." The court apparently reasoned that since dismissals
under Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 may be deemed full and fair adjudica-

JUDMENTS § 41 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973); Brousseau, A Reader's Guide to the Proposed Changes in the PreclusionProvisionsof the Restatement of Judgments, 11 TULSA
L.J. 305, 306-09 (1976).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1970). See Batiste v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 503 F.2d 447,
450 (7th Cir. 1974)("[F]ull faith and credit implemented by federal statute (28 U.S.C.
§ 1738) is the means by which state adjudications are made res judicata."), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 928 (1975).
21. See 553 F.2d at 274-77.
22. Although the court held that appellant incurred the bar of res judicata only
when she "cross[ed] the line between state agency and state judicial proceedings,"
id. at 276, it analyzed each res judicata element, except finality, in the context of the
Human Rights Division proceedings.
23. In an apparent attempt to forestall criticism that the federal law would have
provided appellant with greater protection, the court suggested that the New York law
was broader than either similar federal statutes or the equal protection clause of the
Federal Constitution. See id. at 269-70. Indeed, illegal discriminatory classifications
under New York law include age, disability, and marital status-classifications that
have not been deemed suspect under the equal protection clause and that are not
included in title VII. The New York law, however, does not appear to be substantively
broader than federal law in any way relevant to the result in Mitchell.
24. See id. at 270-73.
25. See id. at 270-71. "The preliminary review for the purpose of determining
probable cause, despite its investigatory and conciliatory aspects, is an adjudicatory
process comparable to the treatment given under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
to a motion for summary judgment or to dismiss for failure to state a claim .
Id. at 270.
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6
tions on the merits for res judicata purposes, a state agency determination employing equivalent standards should be treated equally.
The court also concluded that errors committed by the agency in
finding no probable cause were in any event an insufficient ground
on which to base a finding that there had not been a full and fair
adjudication on the merits.Y Emphasizing that the "[flederal courts
do not sit to review the determinations of state courts," the court
stated that
[t]he doctrine of res judicata does not depend on whether the prior
judgment was free from error .... Otherwise, judgments would
have no finality and the core rationale of res judicata-reposewould cease to exist. ....[There would no longer be a distinction
between direct review of an erroneous judgment and collateral attack. 3

Turning to the issue of whether there had been a final adjudication of appellant's claim in the state proceedings, the court was unable to find that the agency's determination of no probable cause
would be accorded finality by the courts of the state" and relied
instead on the determination of the appellate division, which clearly
was final." Apparently, both the finality and the judicial character
26. See id. at 271; note 18 supra. See generally 1B MooRE's FEDERAL PAMCEc
0.409[1]-[2] (2d ed. 1974).
27. See 553 F.2d at 271-72.
28. Id. at 273.
29. Id. at 272 (citations omitted).
30. See id. at 273. The New York Law provides that "[a]ny person claiming to
be aggrieved by an unlawful discriminatory practice shall have a cause of action in any
court of appropriate jurisdiction for damages and such other remedies as may be
appropriate, unless such person had filed a complaint. hereunder or with any local
commission on human rights." N.Y. ExEc. LAw art. 15, § 297(9) (McKinney Supp.
1977). Moreover,
as to acts declared unlawful by section two hundred ninety-six of this article,
the procedure herein provided shall, while pending, be exclusive; and the
final determination therein shall exclude any other action, civil or criminal,
based on the same grievance of the individual concerned. If such individual
institutes any action based on such grievance without resorting to the procedure in this article, he may not subsequently resort to the procedure herein.
Id. § 300.
Whether the combined effect of these provisions is to render Division dismissals
for lack of probable cause "final" is unclear. It seems likely that such an administrative
determination would bar further administrative consideration, as, for example, by a
different state agency, see Bronx Eye & Ear Infirmary v. New York City Comm'r on
Human Rights, 55 Misc. 2d 22, 284 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1967), but New York courts seem
hesitant to allow Division determinations to preclude subsequent judicial consideration, see Gaynor v. Rockefeller, 21 App. Div. 2d 92, 248 N.Y.S.2d 792 (1964); Division
of Human Rights v. County of Monroe, 88 Misc. 2d 16, 386 N.Y.S.2d 317 (Sup. Ct.
1976); Moran v. Simpson, 80 Misc. 2d 437, 362 N.Y.S.2d 666 (Sup. Ct. 1974). But see
Taylor v. New York City Transit Auth., 309 F. Supp. 785 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) (under New
York law, decisions of administrative agencies are res judicata).
31. See 553 F.2d at 273.
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of the appellate division proceedings were necessary to the court's
decision. Finality was significant not only as an element of res judicata, but also because the potential finality of the appellate proceedings put the appellant "on notice that the determination of the Appellate Division might foreclose any other action in the state
courts."32 The judicial character of the appellate division's proceedings also seems to have been necessary to the decision inasmuch-as
the court stressed that res judicata was applied only because appellant had crossed the line from administrative to judicial remedies.3
Finally, the court determined that the final judgment of the
appellate division implicated 28 U.S.C. § 1738, which requires federal
courts to accord the same full faith and credit to a state court judgment as would be accorded to the judgment by the state courts themselves.34 Although the court recognized that application of res judi35
cata and section 1738 might be limited by competing policies, it
concluded that in this case there was an "absence of countervailing
policy considerations." 3
32. Id. The significance of this statement is uncertain. Notice or foreseeability
of potential preclusion is a factor sometimes considered in the application of collateral
estoppel, see 1B MooRe's FEDERAL PRACTIcME 0.442[21, at 3859-61 (2d ed. 1974), but
seems to be irrelevant in considering preclusion by res judicata, see id. 0.405, at 631-

34.
On an intuitive level one might argue that the harsh penalty of preclusion is fairer
when the risk of preclusion was knowingly undertaken. It is questionable, however,
whether a complainant before Mitchell would have been "on notice" that pursuit of
state appellate review would foreclose subsequent federal relief. Considering the unsettled state of the law and the substantial case law to the contrary in the context of title
VII, a reasonable complainant might easily have concluded that the appellate court
judgment would be of "no consequence." See Benneci v. Department of Labor, N.Y.
State Div. of Employment, 388 F. Supp. 1080, 1082 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), discussed at notes
67-75 infra and accompanying text.
33. See 553 F.2d at 275-77.
34. See id. at 273-74.
35. " 'Other well-defined federal policies, statutory or constitutional, may compete with those policies underlying section 1738.' . . . Appellant has raised a number
of policy objections to giving res judicata effect to the Appellate Division's determination, which, if valid, would prevail over the mandate of § 1738." Id. at 274 (quoting
American Mannex Corp. v. Rozands, 462 F.2d 688, 690 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S: 1040 (1972)).
36. Id. at 276. Appellant apparently argued that federal civil rights claims should
not be subject to the full faith and credit doctrine. The court rejected this argument:
"[T]hat a federal civil rights action is involved. . . is not by itself a valid reason for
denying full faith and credit to the state court proceedings." Id. at 274. Among the
several cases the court cited in support of this proposition, some are inapposite and
the remainder clearly distinguishable. See Brown v. DeLayo, 498 F.2d 1173 (10th Cir.
1974)(no mention of section 1738 where teacher claimed discharge violated due process); Tang v. Appellate Div., 487 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1973)(section 1738 not basis of
decision where attorney challenged state residency requirement and there was no race
issue), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 906 (1974); American Mannex Corp. v. Rozands, 462 F.2d
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Thus, finding that the elements of res judicata were satisfied,
that the presence of a final judicial determination implicated section
1738, and that the policies supporting application of res judicata and
section 1738 outweighed the countervailing policy considerations, the
court held that the section 1981 claim was barred.
While Mitchell was the first case in which a court considered the
application of res judicata and section 1738 to a section 1981 claim,
a number of courts have considered the effect of prior state proceedings on subsequent title VII actions and generally have rejected the
application of res judicata. Despite several significant differences
between title VII and section 1981, 31 three factors suggest that these
title VII cases are relevant in examining the Mitchell decision. First,
both provisions are directed, at least in part, toward eliminating
racial discrimination in employment." Second, the Supreme Court
has emphasized that employment discrimination remedies are
688 (5th Cir.)(taxpayer challenged ad valorem property tax), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1040 (1972); Katz v. Connecticut, 433 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1970)(per curiam)(condemnation case with no race issue; no mention of section 1738); Holm v. Shilensky, 388 F.2d
54 (2d Cir. 1968)(divorce action where the decision turned on choice of laws). In
short, the cases cited bear little relation to the general proposition that civil rights
claims do not form a general exception to section 1738 preclusion.
Appellant also argued that the court's holding would force future complainants
to elect between title VII and section 1981 since pursuit of exhaustion under title VII
might foreclose section 1981 relief. The court's response is described at text accompanying notes 83-85 infra.
37. Although complainant in Batiste v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 503 F.2d 447 (7th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 928 (1975), sought relief under both section 1981 and
title VII, the court confined its opinion to the effect of prior proceedings on title VII
actions.
38. See Hollander v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 392 F. Supp. 90 (D. Conn. 1975);
Ferrell v. American Express Co., 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5458 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); Young v.
South Side Packing Co., 369 F. Supp. 59 (E.D. Wis. 1973); notes 46-75 infra and
accompanying text.
39. Principal among these differences are title VII's exfilicit and detailed procedural system, see note 7 supra, and its greater substantive breadth. While section 1981
bans discrimination only on grounds of race, see, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S.
160 (1976)(section 1981 not addressed to discrimination based on sex); DeGraffenreid
v. General Motors Assembly Div., 558 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1977)(section 1981 not addressed to discrimination based on sex); Mouriz v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 428 F.
Supp. 1025 (E.D. La. 1977)(section 1981 not addressed to discrimination based on
religion or national ancestry), title VII specifies several illegal discriminatory classifications, including sex, religion, and national origin, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970 &
Supp. V 1975). Other differences are suggested in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,
Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975).
40. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 470 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Emporium Capwell Co. v. WACO,
420 U.S. 50, 66 (1975); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973).
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"parallel or overlapping"'" and "independent but related."'" Indeed,
it has been suggested that the principles governing construction and
application of title VII procedural requirements apply with equal
force in the section 1981 context. 3 Finally, although the Mitchell
court suggested that its holding was limited to section 1981,11 there
are significant indications in the court's decision that title VII is
implicated as well.
The few title VII cases in which the issue of res judicata has been
raised manifest a judicial reluctance to allow state proceedings to
foreclose federal employment discrimination claims and generally
rely on important congressional and social policies in rejecting the
application of res judicata. In Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo.," for
example, the complainant had sought title VII relief in federal court
after an adverse ruling in mandatory final arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement. In holding that the title VII claim was
not barred by prior submission of the complaint to final arbitration,"
the Supreme Court relied on the broad policy goals supporting employment discrimination legislation,4' the parallel or overlapping
structure of employment discrimination remedies," and the fact that
the complementary relationship of the forums made it possible for the
41. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974).
42. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 468 (1974)(Marshall,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

43. See Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500 (6th Cir. 1974). In Long the Sixth
Circuit suggested that McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), should

be controlling in section 1981 actions on the issues of burden and order of proof, stating,
"Although McDonnell Douglas was a Title VII case, the principles governing these
procedural matters apply with equal force to a § 1981 action." 496 F.2d at 505 n.11;
cf. Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309, 1316 (6th
Cir. 1974)("[Iln fashioning a substantive body of law under section 1981 the courts
should, in an effort to avoid undesirable substantive law conflicts, look to the principles of law created under Title VII for direction."), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976).
44. See 553 F.2d at 275 n.13.
45. See notes 80-88 infra and accompanying text.
46. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
47. The collective bargaining agreement contained an antidiscrimination clause.
See id. at 39.
48. See id. at 59-60.
49. "Congress enacted Title VII . . .to assure equality of employment opportunities by eliminating those practices and devices that discriminate on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex or national origin." Id. at 44.
50. [T]he legislative history of Title VII manifests a congressional
intent to allow an individual to pursue independently his rights under both
Title VII and other applicable state and federal statutes. The clear inference
is that Title VII was designed to supplement, rather than supplant, existing
laws and institutions relating to employment discrimination.
Id. at 48 (footnote omitted).
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objectives of both forums to be served." The Court summarized its
attitude toward employment discrimination actions in strong terms:
"[C]ourts should ever be mindful that Congress, in enacting Title
VII, thought it necessary to provide a judicial forum for the ultimate
resolution of discriminatory employment claims. It is the duty of the
courts to assure the full availability of this forum.""2
Three circuit courts have considered the effect of extensive proceedings in state agencies on title VII actions. In Voutsis v. Union
Carbide Corp.," complainant brought a sex discrimination claim in
the New York Division of Human Rights. Although Division efforts
resulted in a settlement of the claim,"' the settlement was appealed
twice to the appellate division and remanded each time to the Division to resolve problems of vagueness in the employer's obligations
to the complainant." The Second Circuit held that the subsequent
title VII action in federal court was not barred by res judicata, stating, "The federal remedy is independent and cumulative, ... [and]
the federal claim allows the district court to conduct a 'full scale
inquiry into the charged unlawful motivation in employment practices.' ",6 Moreover, in another part of the opinion, the court stated
that procedural technicalities should not be allowed to defeat potentially valid employment discrimination claims.57
51. "[Ihe relationship between the forums [arbitration and Title VII action
in federal court] is complementary since consideration of the claim by both forums
may promote the policies underlying each." Id. at 50-51.
Other considerations upon which the Court relied included the informality of
arbitration proceedings and consequent loss to complainant of procedural safeguards,
see id. at 57-58, the inappropriateness of the waiver by contract argument in the title
VI context, see id. at 51-52, and the "legally independent origins" of contract and title
VII rights, see id. at 52-53.
52. Id. at 60 n.21.
53. 452 F.2d 889 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 918 (1972).
54. Under the Human Rights Law, the Division may negotiate a conciliation
agreement with respondent. Although complainant may object to the terms and force
a hearing on the merits of his complaint, if the Division finds that the objections are
"without substance," it may dismiss the complaint at any time before the hearing.
Such exercise of the Division's discretion is unreviewable. See N.Y. Exac. LAw art. 15,
§ 297(3)(b)-(c)(McKinney 1972).
55. See State Div. of Human Rights v. Union Carbide Corp., 35 App. Div. 2d
664, 315 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1970)(mem.); State Div. of Human Rights v. Union Carbide
Corp., 34 App. Div. 2d 636, 310 N.Y.S.2d 396 (1970)(per curiam). The Voutsis court
noted that at the time it reached its decision, the settlement was pending in the
Division "for the purpose of making a record appropriate for judicial scrutiny." 452
F.2d at 893.
56. 452 F.2d at 893 (quoting Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 33 (5th
Cir. 1968)).
57. In addition to the res judicata defense, defendant claimed complainant had
filed her complaint with the EEOC before expiration of the deferral period prescribed
by title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (Supp. V 1975). The court suggested that "the
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In Batiste v. Furnco Construction Co.," the Seventh Circuit rejected an argument that an order by the Illinois Fair Employment
Practices Commission was res judicata on any issue in a subsequent
federal action under title VII and section 1981, despite the fact that
such orders were final and had res judicata effect in Illinois courts."
The court found "a strong Congressional policy that plaintiffs not be
deprived of their right to resort to the federal courts for adjudication
of their federal claims under Title VII." This policy, the court emphasized, required "that res judicata not be applied to state adjudications."" The court also disposed of the argument that full faith and
credit should be given to state adjudications under section 1738 by
suggesting that section 1738 was essentially statutory res judicata
and was therefore subject to the same countervailing policies that
precluded application of common law res.judicata12
In Cooper v. Philip Morris, Inc.," minority workers discharged
by defendant complained to the Kentucky Commission on Human
Rights, seeking restoration of their jobs and backpay. After six days
of public hearings, the Commission ordered the employer to rehire
complainants, but denied backpay on the ground that "the evidence was too speculative."'" Complainants subsequently initiated a
title VII action in federal court seeking backpay and attorneys' fees.
The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground that state proceedings were final and therefore
intent of Title VII is remedial and that plaintiffs under it should not be held accountable for a procedural prescience that would have made a Baron Parke happy or a Joseph
Chitty proud." 452 F.2d at 892.
A judicial willingness to relax procedural restrictions in the face of employment
discrimination claims has been indicated by other courts. See, e.g., Shaffield v. Northrup Worldwide Aircraft Serv., Inc., 373 F. Supp. 937, 940 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Antonopulos v. Aerojet-General Corp., 295 F. Supp. 1390, 1395 (E.D. Cal. 1968).
58. 503 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 928 (1975).
59. The district court had ruled that the Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC) order was res judicata on every issue on which the FEPC "had the power
to award the same kind of relief as is available under [title VII." Batiste v. Furnco
Constr. Corp., 350 F. Supp. 10, 15 (N.D. 111. 1972), reu'd, 503 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 928 (1975). Since the FEPC had no power to award attorneys'
fees, the lower court awarded them to plaintiffs, but only those incurred in prosecuting
their federal claim. See id.
60. 503 F.2d at 450. The court relied in part on a then-recent amendment to title
VII requiring the EEOC to accord substantial but not conclusive weight to findings of
state or local authorities. See Public Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L.
No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1970)). The court felt that
this amendment was "strongly indicative of the Congressional policy that final responsibility for the administration of Title VII rests within the federal system." 503 F.2d
at 450 (footnote omitted).
61. 503 F.2d at 450.
62. See id.
63. 464 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1972).
64. Id. at 10.
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preclusive of the federal claim."5 The Sixth Circuit reversed and,
relying primarily on Voutsis, held that the title VII action was not
barred by res judicata.1"
Finally, in Benneci v. Department of Labor, New York State
Division of Employment,67 the case most closely analogous to
Mitchell on its facts, a federal district court held that a final judgment in a state appeals court would not foreclose subsequent title VII
relief in federal court.68 In that case, an employee of the New York
Department of Labor alleged discrimination on the basis of his religion and national ancestry. When his complaint was dismissed by the
Division of Human Rights for lack of probable cause, he pursued the
same course as the appellant in Mitchell, including appeal to the
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court.6 After the appellate division affirmed the administrative determination, complainant
complied with EEOC filing requirements and brought a timely title
VII action in federal district court." In the district court, defendant
moved for summary judgment, arguing that the state proceedings
should be accorded res judicata effect by the federal court. The court
rejected this argument, relying on the federal courts' "'plenary
powers to secure compliance with Title VII' "7 and important congressional policies embodied in the act. 2
While the Benneci court did not explicitly state that a different
result would have been reached had the prior proceedings included a
trial on the merits in state court, it did rule that the appellate proceedings were of "no consequence"7 in the federal action because the
limited scope of review in the appellate division precluded a de novo
consideration by that court.7" This suggests that state proceedings
65. See id.
66. See id. at 11-12. The Cooper court also relied on the 1972 amendment to title
VII, see id. at 12, as did the court in Batiste, see note 60 supra.
67. 388 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
68. See id. at 1082.
69. See Benneci v. State Div. of Human Rights, 38 App. Div. 2d 918, 330
N.Y.S.2d 987 (1972) (mem.).
70. See 388 F. Supp. at 1081. See also note 9 supra.
71. 388 F. Supp. at 1081 (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,
45 (1974)).
72. See id. at 1081-82. The overriding congressional policy, of course, is elimination of employment discrimination. Other congressional policies embodied in title VII
include settlement of employment discrimination claims locally through" 'conference,
conciliation, and persuasion,'" id. at 1081 (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974)), and availability of a "'federal remedy if the state machinery
has proved inadequate,'" id. at 1082 (quoting Voutsis v. Union Carbide Corp., 452
F.2d 889, 893 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 918 (1972)).
73. Id. at 1082.
74. See id. See generallynote 6 supra.
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including de novo consideration by a state court might have gener75
ated a different result.

Thus, before Mitchell, res judicata had rarely been applied to bar
federal employment discrimination claims. In the single reported instance in which pursuit of state remedies resulted in preclusion of a
subsequent federal claim, the state proceedings had included a trial
on the merits in state court," and it is only in this context that there
was any hint prior to Mitchell that pursuing the full gamut of state
procedures might endanger a federal civil rights claim.
The basis on which the Mitchell court distinguished this line
of cases is the distinction between administrative remedies, which
both title VII and section 1981 complainants may pursue without
endangering their federal claims,7 7 and appellate judicial relief,
which, if pursued, erects a bar of res judicata, at least against a
section 1981 claim.78 As the court made clear, res judicata attaches
only when complainant "crosses the line" from administrative to
judicial proceedings. 9
As a rationale for applying res judicata, this distinction may be
criticized on three grounds. First, despite the court's assurance that
its ruling applies only to section 1981 claims, the rationale is not so
easily cabined, and the case may be but a preface to a broader application of res judicata to employment discrimination cases in general.
Second, the rule will inevitably tend to undermine the congressional
preference for local as opposed to federal dispute settlement. Finally,
a mechanical application of the judicial/administrative distinction
without regard to the quality of the proceeding at each stage leads to
anomalies.
There are substantial indications that the Mitchell rule is not
75. While the court emphasized de novo consideration, it seems likely that an
original trial on the merits would possess the same advantages as a de novo proceeding
following administrative proceedings.
76. See Bennun v. Board of Governors of Rutgers, 413 F. Supp. 1274 (D.N.J.

1976). In Bennun, a teacher commenced an action in state court alleging that the
university regents had denied him tenure because of his nationality. After the complainant's state court action was dismissed at the close of his case in chief, he instituted a title VII action grounded on substantially the same events. The federal district
court held that the state court trial had res judicata effect on the subsequent title VII
action:
Principles of res judicata are fully applicable to actions brought under

the federal Civil Rights Act ....
Thus, where a cause of action which encompasses a claim under the Civil Rights Act reaches judgment in one court,
the judgment of that court will be given the same preclusive effect by a
second court as would any other judgment of that first court.
Id. at 1278.
77. See 553 F.2d at 275-76.

78. See id. at 276.
79. Id.
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limited to section 1981 actions. Although the court expressly declined
to discuss the effect of prior judicial proceedings on subsequent title
VII actions, it carefully distinguished several cases holding that res
judicata did not apply to title VII actions on the ground that those
cases "did not involve resort to state judicial remedies." 8 In distinguishing these cases, however, the Mitchell court made no reference
to the decision in Benneci v. Department of Labor, New York State
Division of Employment,81 where a federal district court had refused
to apply res judicata to bar a subsequent title VII claim in federal
court, even though there had been resort to state judicial remedies
after administrative exhaustion.2 Moreover, in rejecting the appellant's argument that the application of res judicata would prohibit
complainants from pursuing title VII and section 1981 remedies concurrently by giving preclusive effect in a section 1981 action to state
remedies undertaken in satisfaction of title VII exhaustion requirements,8 the court in Mitchell relied on the proposition that "deferral
requirements of Title VII do not contemplate resort to state judicial
review." ' u In the court's view, according preclusive effect to determinations of state appellate courts created no conflict between section
1981 and the exhaustion requirements of title VII because those exhaustion requirements did not explicitly include available appellate
review.85 But this argument applies with equal force in the case
where, after pursuit of state judicial remedies, or of any other remedy
not explicitly included in title VII exhaustion requirements, a complainant seeks title VII relief.8 Thus, despite the court's assurances
to the contrary,87 its broad language indicates that the limitation
imposed on section 1981 actions may be extended to title VII actions.
Ultimately, complainants may be forced to make an irrevocable
choice between state appellate remedies and any federal cause of
action.88 Nor have these implications escaped defendants in employ80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 275 n.13.
388 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
See notes 67-72 supra and accompanying text.
See generally note 7 supra.
553 F.2d at 276.

85. See id.
86. It could be suggested that while a section 1981 claimant may exhaust only
those remedies stated explicitly in title VII, a title VII claimant must exhaust the
required remedies but may exhaust others as well. There is no support for this interpretation in either title VII or section 1981, however, and the Mitchell court did not
suggest a basis for such a distinction.

87. See 553 F.2d at 275 n.13.
88. The Supreme Court apparently rejected such a literal and restrictive ap-

proach to construction of title VII exhaustion requirements in Alexander v. GardnerDenver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). There the Court found that resort to final arbitration,
although not a procedural prerequisite to a federal action, did not foreclose title VII
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ment discrimination actions. In at least two cases arising after
Mitchell, defendants have argued that the court's holding extended
to bar title VII actions instituted after state proceedings.2
While the Mitchell court was willing to accept only "arguendo"
that the policies allowing one to exhaust state remedies without foreclosing title VII remedies were applicable in the section 1981 context,"° there appears to be no reason why the differences in scope and
procedure between section 1981 and title VIP1 should require the
inference that the congressional policies underlying title VII are inappropriate in a section 1981 context. Clearly, the fundamental social
policy underlying title VII, eliminating discrimination in employrelief, in part, because "[t]here is no suggestion in the statutory scheme that a prior
arbitral decision ... forecloses an individual's right to sue [under title VIII." Id. at
47.
Several other courts have suggested that both title VII and section 1981 are to be
construed liberally. See, e.g., Davis v. Valley Distrib. Co., 522 F.2d 827, 832 (9th Cir.
1975)(title VII is remedial and should be construed liberally), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1090 (1977); Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500, 505 (6th Cir. 1974)(courts should
adopt broad outlook in enforcing section 1981); Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1375 (5th Cir. 1974)(courts should give a "wide scope" to title VII);
EEOC v. Delaware Trust Co., 416 F. Supp. 1040, 1045 (D. Del. 1976)(courts construe
title VII liberally so as to avoid allowing procedural technicalities to defeat claim);
Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America), 408 F. Supp. 916, 928 n.7 (S.D. Tex. 1976)(section
1981 is to be liberally construed); Player v. Alabama Dep't of Pensions and Security,
400 F. Supp. 249, 265 (M.D. Ala. 1975) (section 1981 to be liberally construed to effect
remedial purposes), aff'd mem., 536 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1976); Kyles v. Calcasieu
Parish Sheriff's Dep't, 395 F. Supp. 1307, 1310 (W.D. La. 1975)(title VII to be given
broad construction).
89. See Gilinsky v. Columbia Univ., 440 F. Supp. 1120, 1121 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
Al-Hamdani v. State Univ., 438 F. Supp. 299, 301-03 (W.D.N.Y. 1977). In Gilinsky,
complainant appealed a dismissal by the State Human Rights Division to the Appeal
Board, and the dismissal was reversed. The defendant thereafter appealed to the New
York Appellate Division, which affirmed the Appeal Board, and then to the Court of
Appeals, which reversed. See State Div. of Human Rights v. Columbia Univ., 39
N.Y.2d 612, 350 N.E.2d 396, 385 N.Y.S.2d 19 (1976), rev'g 48 App. Div. 2d 1012, 372
N.Y.S.2d 208 (1975)(mem.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1096 (1977). In complainant's subsequent title VII suit, defendant urged application of res judicata, relying on Mitchell.
The court refused to apply res judicata, relying in part upon the Mitchell court's
express reservation of this issue in the situation where the defendant appeals. See 440
F. Supp. at 1121-22 (citing Mitchell v. National Broadcasting Co., 553 F.2d 265, 275
n.13 (2d Cir. 1977)). In Al-Hamdani, complainant pursued an identical course as
complainant in-Mitchell including appeal to the appellate division. See State Div. of
Human Rights v. State Univ., 43 App. Div. 2d 663,350 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1973). Complainant in Al-Hamdani, however, brought her federal action under title VII rather than
section 1981. Defendant relied on Mitchell to argue that complainant's title VII action
should be barred by res judicata. The court found Voutsis v. Union Carbide Corp., 452
F.2d 889 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 918 (1972), to be controlling, however,
and refused to bar complainant's action.
90. See 553 F.2d at 274-75. But see id. at 278 (Feinberg, J., dissenting).
91. See note 39 supra.
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ment,' 2 is an appropriate consideration in applying any other device
designed to achieve that end, including section 1981. This similarity
alone argues strongly against any distinction between the two courses
of action with respect to the accessibility of a federal forum.
But even the more specific policy goals of title VII may be served
by section 1981. Title VII procedures are thought to embody congressional judgments that the preferred means of resolving employment
discrimination disputes are persuasion and conciliation at the local
level" and that the opportunity to litigate in federal court should be
available but deferred until conciliatory measures have been attempted." Since section 1981 creates a federal cause of action for
private litigants, it advances the latter goal of providing a federal
forum for federally guaranteed rights. Section 1981 complainants,
however, need not exhaust administrative remedies before proceeding
to federal court." Nevertheless, that administrative exhaustion is not
required in section 1981 actions does not compel the conclusion that
such exhaustion is undesirable and that those who exhaust not only
their state administrative remedies but also their state appellate
remedies should be penalized by depriving them of their section 1981
cause of action. Most judicial statements that administrative exhaustion is not required in section 1981 actions have been made in circumstances in which administrative resolution was no longer feasible
when the section 1981 action was brought. 8 Thus, it seems reasonable
to interpret section 1981 as preserving the alternative of bypassing
administrative remedies when local resolution is perceived by the
complainant as unfeasible. In all other circumstances, however, the
advantages of local resolution are as compelling in section 1981 actions as in actions brought under title VII. Even if limited to section
1981, therefore, the Mitchell court's holding may frustrate the con92. See cases cited note 40 supra. There are indications that the employment
situation of minority workers may be worse today than when title VII was passed in
1964. For example, while the percentage of all employed males over sixteen years of
age fell from 81.5% in 1965 to 78.1% in 1976, the percentage employed of "Black and
other" males fell from 80.3% to 71.9%. See U.S. BURAU OF THE CENsus, DEP'T OF
CommERcE, STArsncAL ABsnmcr OF THE UN=Tr

STATES 388 (98th ed. 1977).

93. See cases cited note 118 infra.
94. See sources cited note 119 infra.
95. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164, 166 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 986 (1976); Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498
F.2d 641, 652 (5th Cir. 1974); Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500, 503-04 (6th Cir.
1974). Compare Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309,
1315 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976), with Waters v. Wisconsin Steel
Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476, 487 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911

(1970).
96. See, e.g., Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500, 502 (6th Cir. 1974)(complainant's title VII remedy unavailable because of failure to file within limitations period).
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gressional preference for local dispute resolution embodied in title VII
by forcing litigants to abandon state procedures in order to preserve
federal remedies.
The most serious shortcoming of the judicial/administrative distinction as a basis for determining the applicability of res judicata is
its failure to take into account the quality of the hearing afforded the
complainant. Since res judicata attaches only when the complainant
"crosses the line" from administrative to judicial relief, one who is
accorded very thorough administrative proceedings, including an evidentiary hearing, an administrative appeal based on a complete factual record, and even an award of relief, is apparently free to pursue
subsequent federal remedies under title VII or section 1981. 91 A complainant like Mitchell, however, whose complaint is summarily dismissed without an evidentiary hearing, whose administrative appeal
is conducted without the benefit of a factual record, and who is
awarded no relief, but whose pursuit of state remedies included appeal to a state court, is foreclosed from seeking federal relief under
section 1981 and possibly under title VII as well.
The Mitchell court justified this result, in large part, by reference
to the policies underlying res judicata. But res judicata is a salutary
equitable doctrine, the purpose of which is to conserve the resources
of the legal system and avoid subjecting parties to burdensome,
repetitious litigation by barring relitigation of claims already fully
and fairly litigated to final judgment." Equity and the specific
policies underlying res judicata depend on factors such as the fairness, completeness, or extensiveness of prior proceedings. Thus, the
Mitchell court's reliance on the distinction between administrative
and judicial relief, rather than on the thoroughness of the consideration offered appellant, appears to be misplaced.
In a related context, the Supreme Court has determined that the
adequacy of the prior proceedings is relevant in deciding whether res
judicata should bar a subsequent title VII action. In Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co.," the complainant had pursued a collectively
bargained mandatory grievance procedure that included a hearing, to
final arbitration.10 In declining to give preclusive effect to the arbitration proceedings, the Supreme Court found that
[t]he factfinding process in arbitration usually is not equivalent to
judicial factfinding. The record of the arbitration proceedings is not
as complete; the usual rules of evidence do not apply; and rights and
97. See, e.g., Batiste v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 503 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 928 (195); Cooper v. Philip Morris, Inc., 464 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1972).
98. See 553 F.2d at 268.
99. 415 U.S. 36 (1974), discussed at notes 46-52 supra and accompanying text.
100. See id. at 38-43.
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procedures common to civil trials, such as discovery, compulsory
process, cross-examination, and testimony under oath, are often severely limited or unavailable. . . . Indeed, it is the informality of
arbitral procedure that enables it to function as an efficient, inexpensive, and expeditious means for dispute resolution. This same
characteristic, however, makes arbitration a less appropriate forum
for final resolution of title VII issues than the federal courts."'
Although the state proceedings in Mitchell and the arbitral proceedings in Alexander are distinguishable,0 2 the differences between
them appear to be insignificant in this context.ln It is likely that state
administrative proceedings are as vulnerable as arbitral proceedings
to the "procedural infirmities" identified by the Supreme Court.10 ' In
fact, this procedural infirmities analysis was relied on by the court
in Ferrell v. American Express Co. 5 to reach its conclusion that
proceedings of the New York Division of Human Rights should not
be accorded preclusive effect.
The Ferrell court identified an additional procedural infirmity
that is also relevant to Mitchell. The defendant in Ferrellargued that
the state proceedings were analogous to a summary judgment ruling,
that is, "a holding that plaintiff has no claim even if his assertions
are accepted as true."" The court responded that "[h]ere, however,
the state agency found that plaintiff's claims were overcome by defendant's evidence, without plaintiff having the aid of counsel to
evaluate the evidence and determine what further evidence would be
helpful."'
The language in Alexander and Ferrell is relevant to the issues
in Mitchell in two respects. First, these cases indicate that, contrary
to the Mitchell court's flat denial, infirmities in state proceedings
are material concerns in deciding whether to accord preclusive effect
to such proceedings. Second, they suggest that the procedural infirmities of administrative proceedings are best cured by de novo proceedings in a trial court. The advantages of a trial court, however, are
101. Id. at 57-58.
102. For example, the arbitration proceedings in Alexander were neither judicial
nor conducted under the authority of the state. Moreover, in the arbitration proceedings, the complainant sought to enforce contractrights rather than rights founded in
state or federal law.
103. Cf. Ferrell v. American Express Co., 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5458, 5461
(E.D.N.Y. 1974)("Plaintiff would distinguish Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co....
on the ground that the prior determination of no discrimination had been made by
arbitrators under a collective bargaining agreement and not by a state agency. This is
not a valid distinction.").
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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not available in an appellate court. Appellate courts do not gather
facts, but rather depend upon the record of facts gathered and evidence presented in proceedings below. Since the infirmities in administrative proceedings include incompleteness of the record and
weakness in the gathering of facts, the appellate courts are, in a sense,
subject to the same infirmities as administrative hearings.10 In this
additional important respect, therefore, the Mitchell court's distinction between administrative and appellate judicial relief seems
clearly inappropriate.
The Mitchell court's analysis of the section 1738 issue may be
similarly criticized. Section 1738 requires federal courts to accord the
same effect to state court judgments as would the state itself. Thus,
the critical question in Mitchell was what effect New York courts
would accord the state proceedings in a subsequent section 1981 action in state court. Since New York courts had never considered this
question, the certainty with which the Mitchell court found that the
section 1981 claim would be barred by New York courts was inappropriate."8 As the Mitchell court recognized, however, even if the decision of the Appellate Division was final within the meaning of section
1738, the demands of both section 1738 and res judicata would give
way in the face of sufficiently weighty countervailing interests. Nevertheless, it ultimately found that the policies furthered by section
108. Cf. Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970). The Waters court, in declining to apply
to a section 1981 action the statute of limitations of the Illinois Fair Employment
Practices Act § 8, ILL. Ray. STAT. ch. 48, § 858 (1967), as amended, ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 48, § 858 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978), which provided for an administrative remedy
and judicial appellate review, stated,
We are not convinced that the Illinois F.E.P.A. is the most analogous state
action under these provisions. The Illinois act provides only for an administrative remedy and review of the F.E.P.C.'s findings in the state courts.
Different considerations obviously apply to suits by private litigants in
courts of law. In contrast to the Illinois F.E.P.A., the entire burden of investigating and developing a case under section 1981 lies with the private litigant.
Furthermore, the short limitations period contained in the Illinois act is
designed to encourage conciliation and private settlement. When an aggrieved party seeks court relief, conciliation has generally failed.
427 F.2d at 488. See generally Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. Rav. 1105,
1118-19 (1977)("corrective state appellate work does not adequately substitute for
vigorous constitutional protection at the trial level"); Shaman &Turkington, Huffman
v. Pursue, Ltd.: The FederalCourthouseDoor Closes Further,56 B.U.L. Rv. 907,92122 (1976)("There is a dramatic difference between the typical context of court review
of, on one hand, a claim that an agency has exceeded the scope of its powers and, on
the other hand, a civil .action under section 1983 for vindication of constitutional
rights.").
109. The court said that "there is no question that a determination of the Appellate Division affirming [a Division dismissal] operates as an absolute bar to any other
action on the same facts in the courts of New York." 553 F.2d at 273.
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1738 and res judicata outweighed any countervailing considerations
raised by appellant's claim.11 Other courts, however, have not found
these policies persuasive,"' and in any case it is not certain that the
Mitchell decision will advance all of the policies upon which it relied.
Conservation of judicial resources, for example, was a recurring
theme in Mitchell." Even the Mitchell holding will allow substantial
expenditure of nonjudicial legal resources without invoking res judicata,"3 and it seems this result is to some extent dictated by the
emphasis that federal employment discrimination legislation places
on persuasion and conciliation in the resolution of discrimination
claims."' It would not be unreasonable to suggest that this emphasis
indicates congressional willingness to sacrifice economy in the legal
system to promote the elimination of employment discrimination. It
might be argued, however, that Congress did not contemplate any
sacrifice of judicial economy and that the situation in Mitchell, involving potential duplication of judicial effort, therefore requires application of res judicata.1" Still, it is not clear that the rule in
Mitchell will result in increased judicial economy in the long run.
A likely result of the decision will be to encourage complainants
to abandon state remedies at the earliest possible opportunity in
order to preserve their federal causes of action."' Some of these claims
surely would have been resolved at the administrative level had the
claimant persisted, and in others, the administrative proceedings
110. See id. at 274-77.
111. See cases cited note 18 infra.
112. See 553 F.2d at 268, 276. The court begins and ends its opinion with this

refrain.
113. See id. at 276 ("Res judicata attached when plaintiff chose to pursue her
claim in the state courts, and not before.").
114. See cases cited note 118 infra.
115. The court did not suggest, however, why administrative resources are less
valuable or less deserving of conservation than judicial resources.
116. An analogous concern was expressed in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36 (1974), where the Court noted that requiring federal courts to defer to prior
arbitration determinations
might adversely affect the arbitration system as well as the enforcement
scheme of Title VII. Fearing that the arbitral forum cannot adequately protect their rights under Title VII, some employees may elect to bypass arbitration and institute a lawsuit. The possibility of voluntary compliance or set-

tlement of Title VII claims would thus be reduced, and the result could well
be more litigation, not less.
Id. at 59. Similarly, Judge Leventhal, concurring in Hackley v. Roudebush, 520 F.2d
108 (D.C. Cir. 1975), noted that granting a summary judgment against plaintiff in a
title VII case on the basis of an administrative record "is likely to undercut availability
of the [agency's] expertise by encouraging [complainants] to exercise their option
to proceed to court forthwith, for immediate relief, without pursuing an appeal to the
[administrative appeal board]." Id. at 171.

1008

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:987

might have clarified and crystalized issues. These effects, which
clearly enhance economy of judicial resources, will be diminished to
the extent that Mitchell deters persistence in state remedies.117 A
117. Compare Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 461, 465
(1975), with Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59 (1974). Although only
a year apart, these two decisions seem to express different views about the significance
of the potential adverse effect a particular decision would have on administrative
conciliation and voluntary compliance. In Alexander, in the context of a decision
whether to allow arbitral proceedings to preclude subsequent title VII actions, a unanimous Court found the "adverse effects" argument persuasive. See id. In Johnson,
however, in deciding that the running of the statute of limitations against a section
1981 action was not tolled by pursuit of title VII remedies, the Court said,
[lit is conceivable, and perhaps almost to be expected, that failure to toll
will have the effect of pressing a civil rights complainant who values his
§ 1981 claim into court before the EEOC has completed its administrative
proceeding. One answer to this, although perhaps not a highly satisfactory
one, is that the plaintiff in his § 1981 suit may ask the court to stay proceedings until the administrative efforts at conciliation and voluntary compliance have been completed. But the fundamental answer to petitioner's argument lies in the fadt-presumably a happy one for the civil rights claimant-that Congress clearly has retained § 1981 as a remedy against private
employment discrimination separate from and independent of the more
elaborate and time-consuming procedures of Title VII.
421 U.S. at 465 (footnote omitted). This language is difficult to reconcile with
Alexander. Indeed, Justice Marshall, in his concurring and dissenting opinion in
Johnson, argued that the reasoning in Alexander was equally compelling in the statute
of limitations context:
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver. . we examined the relationship between compulsory arbitration and litigation under Title VII, a relationship
analogous to that between the EEOC factfinding and conciliation process
and litigation under § 1981, and accommodated both avenues of redress. The
reasoning leading to that result is equally compelling here. Forced compliance with a short statute of limitations during the pendency of a charge
before the EEOC would discourage and/or frustrate recourse to the congressionally favored policy of conciliation, . . . and "[tihe possibility of voluntary compliance or settlement of Title VII claims would thus be reduced, and
the result could well be more litigation, not less."...
Congressional effort, with the 1972 amendments, to strengthen the administrative remedy by increasing EEOC's ability to conciliate complaints
is frustrated by the majority's requirement that an employee file the § 1981
action prior to the conclusion of the Title VII conciliation efforts in order to
avoid the bar of the statute of limitations. Legislative pains to avoid unnecessary and costly litigation by making the informal investigatory and conciliatory offices of EEOC readily available to victims of unlawful discrimination
cannot be squared with the formal mechanistic requirement of early filing
for the technical purpose of tolling a limitations statute. In sum, the federal
policies weigh strongly in favor of tolling.
Id. at 472-73 (footnote and citations omitted).
Although Johnson reflects a changing attitude by the Court concerning the significance of section 1981's role in the scheme of employment discrimination, it is possible
to reconcile Alexander with Johnson without vitiating the role of section 1981. This
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similar effect may be predicted if complainants who fully exhaust
administrative remedies proceed directly to federal court instead of
appealing within the state court system. Thus, at best, the Mitchell
court has exchanged the privilege of access to the federal forum for a
speculative enhancement of judicial economy. At worst, the decision
will advance neither the cause of eliminating employment discrimination nor judicial economy.
Perhaps a more significant criticism, however, is that many of
the arguments raised in Mitchell have been dismissed summarily by
other courts in the face of two congressional policies to which the
Mitchell court referred only in passing: the desirability of local resolution of employment discrimination claims"' and the importance of
preserving access to a federal forum." 9
reading would stress the effect of each case in terms of its preclusion of alternate
remedies.
Thus, in Alexander, the consequences of according preclusive effect to arbitral
proceedings would have been to deny access to such proceedings to any complainant
who desired to preserve title VII remedies. This would force complainants to elect
between arbitration and title VII remedies. In Johnson, however, the Court's decision
does not, necessarily, force such an election. Administrative conciliation and voluntary
compliance may be pursued without jeopardizing the section 1981 remedy as long as
the statute of limitations is not exceeded. In some states, the statute will provide ample
time during which to exhaust administrative remedies. See, e.g., Greene v. Carter
Carburetor Co., 532 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1976)(applying five-year Missouri statute of
limitations); Beamon v. W.B. Saunders Co., 413 F. Supp. 1167 (E.D. Pa. 1976)(applying six-year Pennsylvania statute of limitations); Lattimore v. Loews Theatres, Inc.,
410 F. Supp. 1397 (M.D.N.C. 1975)(applying three-year North Carolina statute of
limitations). Even the one-year statute under which complainant was barred in
Johnson may be sufficient to exhaust local conciliation remedies, which are often
expedited. In Mitchell, for example, appellant exhausted all local resolution remedies
within one year of her dismissal. See 553 F.2d at 266-67. Moreover, the Johnson court
suggested that if a complainant desires to pursue administrative conciliation and yet
preserve the section 1981 remedy from the bar of the statute, he may file a section 1981
action and ask the court to stay proceedings until chances for local resolution are
exhausted. Although this latter alternative may deter voluntary compliance and conciliation, see 421 U.S. at 465, it seems equally likely that the filing of a section 1981
action while administrative exhaustion is being pursued may spur settlement efforts.
It is suggested that since Mitchell will force complainants to elect between a
remedy that may enhance local resolution (state appellate review of the local resolution
process) and the section 1981 remedy, it is more analogous to Alexander than to
Johnson.
118. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974); Voutsis v.
Union Carbide Corp., 452 F.2d 889, 891-92 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 918
(1972); Ferrell v. American Express Co., 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5458, 5460 (E.D.N.Y.
1974).
119. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 60 n.21 (1974); Voutsis
v. Union Carbide Corp., 452 F.2d 889, 894 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 918
(1972); Ferrell v. American Express Co., 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5458, 5460 (E.D.N.Y.
1974); Note, Employment Discriminationand Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
84 HARv. L. Rav. 1109, 1212 (1971).
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The Mitchell court curtly dismissed the argument that its holding would discourage local resolution, stating, "[O]f course, by the
time appellant sought review in the Appellate Division, all efforts at
conciliation had long been concluded.""'2 The court, however, ignored
the possibility that appellate review by state courts may have longrange benefits enhancing local resolution. Vigorous appellate review
is essential to the vitality and integrity of local administrative remedies. In the context of civil rights legislation, complex and controversial procedural and substantive issues that must be resolved by state
courts will necessarily arise. If the price of state appellate review is
the sacrifice of federal remedies under section 1981 and ttl'e VII,
these issues might not be raised. Some complainants will- not be
deterred by potential loss of federal remedies, but others will avoid
appellate review and proceed directly to federal court, thus reducing
the opportunity for state courts to review and improve state administrative proceedings. This will retard the growth of local administrative programs in the long run and perhaps even diminish their current
effectiveness.
Another aspect of the role of appellate review in local resolution
is that, in many circumstances, if complainant's appeal is successful,
the case will be remanded to the administrative agency for reconsideration. Such a remand seems particularly appropriate in situations such as that in Mitchell, where the court has an incomplete
factual record to review."' Thus, while the parties may have sacrificed the immediacy and economy of local resolution by appealing to
state court, a second opportunity for the local agency to secure voluntary resolution through conciliation and persuasion may be preserved. This opportunity would be lost if complainants desiring to
preserve federal remedies were forced to forgo appellate review and
the possibility of reconsideration by the local agency.
A second specific congressional policy involved in employment
discrimination actions is the importance of access to a federal forum.
Other courts have emphasized not only their "plenary powers"'2 to
enforce compliance with federal employment discrimination legisla120. 553 F.2d at 276.
121. Cf Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57-58 (1974) (suggesting

that one factor in assigning responsibility within the federal judicial system for resolution of constitutional issues is that the administrative "factfinding process," particularly in arbitration, "is not equivalent to judicial factfinding," and that the relative
incompleteness of the record in arbitral proceedings is a consideration in this determination); Ferrell v. American Express Co., 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5458, 5461 (E.D.N.Y.
1974)(applying the Supreme Court's analysis in Alexander in the context of a dismissal

for lack of probable cause by the New York Division of Human Rights).
122. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 45 (1974); Benneci v.

Department of Labor, N.Y. State Div. of Employment, 388 F. Supp. 1080, 1081
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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tion but also their responsibility to do so. 'm The particular dimensions of this responsibility seem to require that a federal court make
its own findings. In Batiste v. Furnco Construction Co.,124 for example, the case was remanded to the district court in part because it
"merely accepted the ruling of [the state agency] and it did not
attempt to make its own determination." ' Similarly, in Benneci v.
Department of Labor, New York State Division of Employment, 2'
the court stressed the power of the federal court "to conduct a full
scale inquiry . . . and to make de novo findings of fact." 2 Thus,
several courts, including the Supreme Court, have recognized that
the congressionally mandated role of the federal courts in employment discrimination actions encompasses a responsibility to conduct
de novo proceedings aimed at ensuring that employment discrimination complainants have an adequate opportunity to present their
claims in a forum free from the "procedural infirmities" that characterize state administrative proceedings. In sharp contrast, the
Mitchell court seems to suggest a much more restricted role for federal courts, a role in which judicial economy assumes greater significance in the determination of a complainant's rights than does the
overriding congressional goal of eliminating employment discrimination or the specific congressional goals embodied in the mechanism
designed to implement that goal, a role that further closes the door
to the federal courts for civil rights litigants at a time when the
unfulfilled promise of employment discrimination legislation demands more aggressive and imaginative participation by these
courts. 12r

These criticisms are not intended to suggest that res judicata is
never appropriate in an employment discrimination action in federal
123. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 60 n.21 (1974); Voutsis
v. Union Carbide Corp., 452 F.2d 889, 894 (2d Cir. 1971)("[Ihe purposes underlying
enactment of [title VI] were clearly based on the congressional recognition that...
'state and local [antidiscrimination] laws vary widely in effectiveness. In many areas
effective enforcement is hampered by inadequate legislation, inadequate procedures,
or an inadequate budget. Big interstate industry cannot effectively be handled by the
states.' ")(quoting 2 B. ScHwAm Z, STATUTORY HISTORY OF TE UNITED STATES 1290
(1970)(remarks of Sen. Clark)), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 918 (1972); Ferrell v. American
Express Co., 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5458, 5460 (E.D.N.Y. 1974)(" 'The basic rights protected are rights which accrue to citizens of the United States; the Federal Government
has the clear obligation to see that they are fully protected.' ") (quoting 110 CONG. REC.
12725 (1964)(remarks of Sen. Humphrey)).
124. 503 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 928 (1975), discussed at
notes 58-62 supra and accompanying text.
125. Id. at 451.
126. 388 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), discussed at notes 67-75 supra and
accompanying text.
127. Id. at 1082.
128. See also Shaman & Turkington, supra note 108.
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court. Rather, an approach is recommended that takes into account
the competing interests of state and federal courts and of plaintiffs
and defendants in employment discrimination cases while advancing
the substantial policies underlying employment discrimination legislation. Important factors underlying such an approach include the
degree to which the state proceedings were free from the "procedural
infirmities" to which administrative and appellate judicial remedies
may be subject,1 29 policies of federalism and comity between state and
federal courts,'30 and the interest of defendants in avoiding burdensome and repetitious litigation.
Although it might be possible to weigh the suggested factors in
order to balance the competing interests on a case-by-case basis, such
an analysis could be perceived as an inappropriate attempt by federal
courts to assume an appellate role in relation to state courts. 3 ' Moreover, the severity of the consequences of preclusion and the potential
for surprise and injustice call for predictability and notice to those
whose claims may be threatened. Adoption of a per se rule, however,
would ameliorate both of these problems. Since the rule and not the
presence or absence of error in the state proceedings would govern the
decision whether to preclude, the problem of federal review of state
proceedings would be avoided. The existence of the rule would also
serve as notice to employment discrimination complainants.
The rule urged by this analysis is that res judicata effect be
accorded to state proceedings in a subsequent federal employment
discrimination action only when the state proceedings included a
trial on the merits.'32 It is suggested that for several reasons this rule
129. Cf. McCormack, supra note 15, at 257-59 (recommending the establishment of a "reasonable preclusion policy" in section 1983 actions):
The integrity of the state courts depends on their decisions' being authoritative, and the authority of those courts is weakened if they become, as a
matter of course, merely a stopping-off place on the way to final decision.
On the other hand, these policies must not be allowed to overwhelm the
importance of protecting constitutional rights. A proper assessment should
take into account the institutional interests of the respective court systems,
the character of the claim and the way in which it arose, the nature of the
interests the plaintiff seeks to vindicate, the possibility of prejudice to the
defendant, and other factors that bear on the proper balance between correct
resolution of constitutional claims and the policies behind res judicata. Sufficient flexibility in the modem doctrine of res judicata can be demonstrated
to allow this balancing process.
130. See generally AMERIcAN LAW INSTrUE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS

(1969); H. FRIENDLY,

FEDERAL JURISDICTION:

A GENERAL Vmw 55-107 (1973); McCormack, supra note 15.
131. See, e.g., Bricker v. Crane, 468 F.2d 1228, 1231 (1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied,

410 U.S. 930 (1973); Frazier v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 363 F.2d 861 (5th
Cir. 1966).
132. Trial "on the merits" is used here in a rather specialized sense to include
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will best serve the competing interests and policies involved in employment discrimination actions and, at the same time, achieve the
advantages of a per se rule. First, a trial on the merits would be less
subject to the procedural infirmities that characterize administrative
and appellate remedies.'33 Second, the policies supporting res judicata, particularly judicial economy and defendants' interest in repose, may weigh more heavily when the state proceedings included a
trial on the merits.'34 Finally, the suggested rule reconciles the cases
prior to Mitchell more satisfactorily and completely than does the
135
Mitchell decision.
The corollary of this recommendation is that, in the absence of
a trial on the merits, administrative and appellate judicial proceedings should not be accorded res judicata effect in subsequent federal
employment discrimination actions. Rather, the federal court should
receive the facts developed in such state proceedings in the same
manner as any other relevant evidence on the merits of a claim and
accord the state proceedings weight in proportion to their thoroughness, the protections they afford to complainant's rights, and the
extent to which they avoid the "procedural infirmities" identified by
the Supreme Court. 3 ' Thus, for example, facts developed during
administrative or appellate proceedings in which complainant was
adequately represented and had full opportunity to present his case
and to test his opponent's case and in which an adequate record was
established might warrant the finding that there exists no genuinely
disputed factual issue, thereby enabling defendant to prevail on a
some pretrial dismissals considered to be on the merits. Thus, for example, a grant of
summary judgment for defendant after adequate discovery could be accorded preclusive effect. Access to discovery by plaintiff and his attorney would go far to cure the
procedural infirmities of administrative hearings. The discretion.of the trial court to
refuse to preclude a claim when injustice would result would ensure that preclusion
based on summary judgment would not become oppressive.
Dismissal in state court for failure to state a claim, however, although technically
"on the merits," see RESTATEMENT (SE cOND) OF JUDGMENM § 48, Comment d (Tent.
Draft No. 1, 1973), should not be accorded res judicata effect in employment 'discrimination actions in federal court. Pleading requirements as well as substantive coverage
of the state and federal laws may differ sufficiently that a complaint inadequate on
its face in state court might survive in federal court. Moreover, other factors, such as
judicial economy and the potential for prejudice to defendant, are not as strongly
implicated when the prior action is limited to dismissal for failure to state a claim.
133. See notes 101-08 supraand accompanying text.
134. See text accompanying note 98 supra; note 112 supra and accompanying
text.
135. See notes 46-75 supra and accompanying text.
136. Cf. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 60 n.21 (1974) (weight
to be given an arbitral determiiation in a subsequent judicial proceeding), discussed
at notes 46-52 & 99-101 supra and accompanying text.
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motion for summary judgment,"' just as he would if pretrial discovery disclosed equivalent facts. On the other hand, state proceedings such as those in Mitchell, in which the complainant was unrepresented during the fact-gathering process, in which there was no evidentiary hearing, and in which no adequate record was established,
would be accorded little weight by the federal trial court.
In a case of first impression, the Mitchell court concluded that
pursuit of state remedies beyond the administrative level to the state
appellate judiciary resulted in preclusion of a subsequent federal
claim under section 1981. There are persuasive indications that the
court is prepared to extend its holding to include title VII actions. In
reaching its decision the court accorded great weight to policies underlying res judicata and found that there were no persuasive countervailing policy considerations. But the foregoing analysis suggests
that the policy arguments arrayed against the Mitchell decision are
substantial and that other courts have found them to be conclusive
in the context of title VII. This analysis concludes that an alternative
to the rule laid down in Mitchell will promote a more reasonable
balance among the competing policies and interests involved in employment discrimination actions as well as reconcile the case law
prior to Mitchell. The alternative recommended is that res judicata
effect should be accorded to state proceedings in a subsequent federal
employment discrimination action only where the state proceedings
included a trial on the merits. In all other cases, facts developed in
state proceedings should be considered only insofar as they illuminate
the relative merits of the claim of discrimination.

137.

See note 25 supra and accompanying text.

